The essays collected in this volume form the basis of Bob Rowthorn’s justly deserved reputation as the most original of the generation of Marxist economists which emerged in Britain in the sixties and early seventies. Bob Rowthorn says that the common thread to the theoretical and empirical papers is ‘their emphasis on the importance of power and conflict in capitalist societies’. Perhaps more significantly they represent a major contribution to the attempt to develop Marxist economics as a way of understanding the present. This involves a critique both of the recent critics of Marxism (notably the Sraffans) and of the fundamentalist Marxists (for example, Ernest Mandel).

‘Neo-classicism, neo-Ricardianism and Marxism’ (which in fact was first published in the Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists in 1972/3, not in the New Left Review in 1974) is a classic statement of the positive distinguishing features of Marxist economics. The fundamental point then is that the ‘Neo-Ricardians’ are guilty of precisely the same failure to analyse the social aspects of the production process as are the neo-classicals. What is rather tantalising is that Bob Rowthorn has not added a postscript stating his position on the neo-Ricardian critique of Marx, as exemplified by Ian Steedman’s recent book Marx after Sraffa. All Bob Rowthorn says in the introduction is that ‘some of Sraffa’s followers, such as Ian Steedman, have since accepted this criticism and have extended their analysis to take these social aspects into account’. Now they certainly say they have done this, but the crucial question is the extent to which this can adequately be done while jettisoning a labour-based value theory as Ian Steedman does. Bob Rowthorn clearly still uses a value theory framework for at least some purposes. The Steedman critique has had a definite impact and it is a shame that Bob Rowthorn’s position is not made clear.

A long, and previously unpublished essay on Marx’s theory of wages is mainly aimed at clarifying Marx’s own, sometimes contradictory, writing on the subject.

Three points which emerge from this piece are used in Rowthorn’s own very important analysis of inflation presented in a technical way in ‘Conflict, Inflation and Money’ and non-technically in ‘Inflation and Crisis’. These are that trade unions modify but do not abolish the influence of the reserve army of labour on wages (a point denied by the Cambridge neo-Keynesians like Godley); that even though Marx gave a simple and unambiguous definition of the value of labour power, his various attempts all embody the idea that at any time there is a minimum standard of life which capital must provide for workers and their families, and unless it does so there will be very serious economic and political consequences and that in a situation of unconvertible paper money Marx’s argument (accepted by many of the
orthodox) that money wage increases cannot be passed on in higher prices since the state may respond to wage pressure by raising interest rates. He develops a conflict theory of inflation, based on inconsistency aspirations of workers and capitalists for living standards and profit rates. A certain level of unemployment, which results when the state is forced to terminate its loose money policy for fear of the consequences of accelerating inflation, is actually necessary to the capitalist system as the discipline which reduces the workers' pretensions - the natural rate of unemployment beloved by the monetarists in reality means precisely this. Rowthorn says in his introduction that left-Keynesians objected to his suggestion that monetary policy may provide an effective instrument of demand management. Would they still object with Thatcherism seeking precisely to discipline the trade unions with monetary policy?

Bob Rowthorn's own analysis of the world economic crisis is presented in his review of Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism. Rowthorn's analysis of the profits squeeze is of particular interest. The underlying factor he sees as the drying up of the reserve army which increased the strength of the working class in demanding both more social spending and higher wages, especially to compensate for taxes levied on them to pay for the social spending and the price increases when import costs rocketed in 1972-74. But faster money wage increases just bring inflation provided the state expands its spending and the money supply correspondingly. Rowthorn argues that the profits squeeze derives primarily from the fact that governments were forced, for fear of the consequences of hyperinflation, to put the brakes on demand, thus restricting capitalists' ability to pass on the wage increases. This is really a stagnation theory of the profit squeeze; stagnation deliberately induced for fear of inflation. Whilst this undoubtedly reflects what transpired after 1973 I personally doubt it was the main factor behind the generalised profits squeeze before 1973. It seems to me that labour shortage itself is the main explanation; competition between capitalists for labour forced up real, and not just money, wages, this increase in real wages being necessary to knock out the least productive capitals and allow labour to be transferred to the more productive.

In considering Mandel's argument about the third technological revolution, Rowthorn quite correctly stresses that the possibilities for continued technical progress are by no means exhausted, given the right restructuring of capital; it is interesting that a major problem he does identify — the difficulty of increasing service sector productivity — is itself more problematic in the era of microchips.

It is disappointing that the book contains no detailed analysis of the crisis of the UK economy. One strange argument he does advance is that it was the working class's lack of militancy in the fifties and sixties which allowed the ruling class to get away with its suicidal policy of imperial pretensions and low investment. He says that a more militant approach by hastening the crisis would have led to a much more positive state policy of intervention. This seems an extraordinary argument. Undoubtedly working class power was already a major factor inhibiting the capitalists in the fifties and early sixties; Japanese capitalists did not require pressure from militant workers to accumulate and modernise; indeed their great boom was based on a work force whose organisations were smashed in the late forties. Surely an even more militant trade union movement would have provoked an even earlier turn to all-out Thatcherism.

Bob Rowthorn quite correctly stresses that economic militancy is not enough, and must be sustained by a political programme. But is the alternative economic strategy (AES) really capable of bringing 'certain material benefits to the working class' since by 'challenging the undisputed authority of capital (it) would destabilise the political situation and lead to demands for further change' (p. 145)? Again, it is a shame that there is no thorough discussion of the AES. It is interesting that in an earlier (1974) pamphlet to which he contributed a section (reprinted here) on the UK's international role he says that 'in order to exercise effective control over the economy and because of foreign pressure for liquidation, a left government would be compelled to nationalise wide sections of the city and industry' (p. 84). Surely this is closer to a demand to nationalise the 200 major monopolies than the AES's modest 20-25! The same pamphlet argues that foreign capitalist opposition to a socialist Britain could be divided by an intelligent policy of offering tangible benefits to co-operation: 'if Britain offered compensation for property taken over and proposed reasonable trade deals, most capitalist countries would have strong reasons for co-operating.' This seems highly optimistic. The fear that the contagion of socialism would spread would surely dictate outright hostility from foreign capitalists which could only be counteracted by working-class solidarity. This would hardly be helped by selling off UK assets overseas to their bosses.

Two final points. Whilst his range of interests in the seventies makes an excellent collection of essays, I hope Bob Rowthorn's output in the eighties will include more sustained work on the UK and world crisis and socialist strategies. Lastly, if Milton Friedman's latest book is published simultaneously in paperback and hardback so should Bob Rowthorn's. £8.50 is a lot to pay for a book, especially such an important one.

Andrew Glyn