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**DOES A SEX HAVE A HISTORY?
'WOMEN' AND FEMINISM**

The black abolitionist and freed slave, Sojourner Truth, spoke out at the 1851 Akron convention and named her own toughness in a famous peroration against the notion of woman's disqualifying frailty. She rested her case on her refrain: 'Ain't I a woman?' It's my hope to persuade readers that a new Sojourner Truth, from the platform of feminist politics, might well - except for the catastrophic loss of grace in the wording - issue another plea: 'Ain't I a fluctuating identity?' For both concentration on and refusal of the identity of 'women' are essential to feminism. This its history makes plain.

FEMINISM AND THE IDENTITY OF 'WOMEN'

The Active status of woman has been proposed by some Lacanian work,¹ while others have argued that in the end sexual identities are nevertheless firmly secured by psychoanalysis.² From the side of deconstruction, Derrida among others has advanced what he calls the 'undecidability' of woman.³ I want to sidestep these arguments in order to move to the ground of historical construction, including the history of feminism itself, and suggest that not only 'woman' but also 'women' is troublesome, and that this extension of our suspicions is in the interests of feminism - that we can't bracket off the evident hysteria which has enthroned 'Woman', whose capital letter alerts us to her dangers, and has also overshadowed the modest lower-case 'woman', while leaving unexamined the ordinary, innocent-sounding 'women'.

This 'women' can't represent good sense; the dominion of fictions has a wide sway. The extent of its reign can be partly revealed by looking at the historical formations of 'women' as a category as well as at the results of the many sociological endeavours in which it has been put to work. To put it all schematically: 'women' is historically and discursively constructed, always in relation to other categories which themselves change; 'women' is a volatile collectivity in which female persons can be very differently positioned so that the apparent continuity of the subject of 'women' isn't to be relied on; 'women' is both synchronically and diachronically erratic as a collectivity, while for the individual 'being a woman' is also inconstant and can't provide an ontological foundation; yet these instabilities of the category of 'women' are the *sine qua non* of feminism, which would otherwise be lost for an object, despoiled of a fight, and, in short, without any life.

Why should it be claimed that the constancy of 'women' may be undermined

in the interests of feminism? Woman, capitalized, is in blatant disgrace, woman is transparently suspicious - but, it might be argued, why lose any sleep over a descriptive category like 'women'? Moreover, how could feminism itself operate if its founding category is also to be dragged into the shadows which are properly cast by Woman? And while, given the untidiness of linguistic usage, there will inevitably be some slippery margins between 'woman' and 'women', this, surely, ought not to worry any level-headed speaker? If only the seductive fraud represented by 'woman' is exposed, and the neutral collectivity of 'women' is carefully substituted, then the ground is prepared for political fights to take place, armed with clarity. Not woman, but women - then we can get on with it.

Certainly socialist feminism has always tended to argue that women are socially produced, or are 'conditioned', and that femininity is an effect. But 'conditioning' has its drawbacks as an idea, and the social or society as agents are vague and treacherous entities. Moreover, several forms of American and British cultural and radical feminism do have faith in the integrity of 'women' as a category, and some proffer versions of a female nature or value-system which a slightly older feminism has always sought to shred to bits⁴ while factions flourish in the shade cast by this powerful naturalism about 'women'. Perhaps the only chance to avoid retreading these constant historical loops which assert or deny a natural disposition, like pacifism, to women lies in a grander gesture - to stand back and to announce: 'women' *are not*. And then, hard on that defiant assertion, to be scrupulously careful to elaborate it; to plead that all definitions of women must be looked at with an eagle eye, wherever they emanate from and whoever is pronouncing them, and that such a scrutiny is in itself a thoroughly feminist undertaking. The will to support this is not blandly social-democratic, for it doesn't aim to vault over the stubborn harshness of gender in querying sexed categories, nor yet to assert a glorious indifference to politics under the banner of some new claim to androgyny. Refusing to dissociate itself from feminism by naming itself as some neutrally deconstructing gesture, it also would refuse to usher feminism wholly into the camp of the lovers of 'real women'.

And here someone might retort that there *are* real, 'concrete' women and there always have been. There were women long before the nineteenth century unfolded its tedious course. What Foucault did for 'the homosexual' cannot be done for women, and historical constructionism has run mad if it's thought otherwise. Nor can it be overlooked that women's distinctive needs and sufferings are all too real. And then how is it possible to have a politics of women - feminism - if that's accompanied by an apparent disdain for real women?

Yet women's unmet needs and sufferings don't spring from a social reality of oppression *which is to be posed against* what is said about women - but from the ways in which women are positioned, often harshly or stupidly, as 'women'; a positioning in language and in practices which doesn't make the combat between the two a sensible one. Clearly appeals to 'women's' needs, rightful places, or extraordinary capacities don't on their own guarantee their progressiveness, accuracy, or conservatism. A social policy innovative in its implications, for instance, may be couched in a conservatively familial language

with results ambiguous for feminism. What female persons under what circumstances will be addressed by the name of 'women', who will be counted, often needs some effort of translation to follow. For becoming, or indeed desisting from being named as, a sexed creature is a restless business, whether on the great scale of history or in private dailiness. Feminism has been at times as vexed with the urgency of disengaging from the category of 'women' as it has with laying claim to it; twentieth-century European feminism has been constitutionally torn between fighting against over-feminization and against under-feminization, especially where social policies are concerned. Certainly the wants and actions of women often need to be fished out of obscurity, to be rescued from the blanket dominance of 'man', or, as feminist historians used to put it, to be 'made visible'. But that is not all. For there are always too many invocations of 'women', too much visibility, too many appellations which were better dissolved again - or at best are in need of some accurate, delimiting handling. So that the precise specification of 'women' in the name of feminism might well occasionally mean forgetting 'women' - or rather, remembering them more helpfully by not naming them. At times feminism might have nothing oppositional to say about 'women' where that category was being publicly flourished, where an excess of identification would swallow and overwhelm counter-identification.

This isn't to imply that all invocations of 'women' are bad, or to suggest that there is some correct or tolerable level of feminization to which feminism has special access. Both these points could generate much argument, but what's suggested here is that the volatility of 'women' is so marked that the speed or the slowness with which it is voiced may determine which alliances feminism makes. Some politicians' interest may descend like lightning to illuminate 'women' and may do so from virtually anywhere in the political firmament. This may happen against an older, slower backdrop of gradually altering understandings of what sexual characters are, and a fitful concentration on 'women' which is voiced at high speed may or may not resonate with more massive background alterations which sway to quite different chronologies. And from the standpoint of feminist tactics, the speed and elasticity required to assert or to reject particular identities of 'women' in their differences or equality aren't at odds with awareness of the longer shapings of sexual categories which, in their post-1790s upheavals, have generated feminism itself.

This means that feminism need not be tormented by the apparent choice between a political realism which will brook no nonsense about the uncertainties of 'women' as a collectivity, and deconstructionist gestures without allegiances. A belief in the solidity of 'women' isn't necessary and doubts on this score needn't be confined to the giddy detachment of the academy, to the semiotic seminar rooms where politics do not tread. There are alternatives to those schools of thought which in saying that 'woman' is fictional are silent on women' and those which proclaim in the name of political feminism that the reality of women is yet to come - but this time, it's 'we', women, who will define her. Resulting oscillations between deconstruction and transcendence, assigned respectively to writing and to politics, might be balanced by this suggestion: that 'women' is indeed an unstable category but that this instability has an

historical foundation. And that feminism itself both as politics and as thought about women must be the place of the systematic fighting-out of that instability - which need not worry us.

It is sometimes feared that to acknowledge any semantic instability of 'women' would at once plunge you into a vague whirlpool of 'post-gendered subjectivities' and would abandon any cutting edges of feminism for the seductions of an ostensibly new but well-worked indifference to the actual masteries of gender; that the known dominants would only be strengthened. This could follow, but need not. The move from questioning the ahistoricity of sexed identities to celebrating the carnival of diffuse and contingent sexualities isn't inevitable.

TEMPORALITY AND SEXED CONSOLIDATIONS

For there are differing *temporalities* of 'women' which act to replace the alternatives of eternity or undifferentiation with 'at times a woman'. So they escape that unappetizing choice between the monotony of 'women' who are always solidly women, and the evanescence of no-longer-women, post-women, who have seen it all and are tired of it. 'Being a woman' has differing periodicities which are not only phenomenological, played out moment by moment for the individual, but are also historical - collectivities and characterizations of 'women' are established in a myriad historical-discursive formations. And the interesting aspect of this is, I think, how the individual-phenomenological and the historical aspects are related.

Part of the preoccupation of feminism has been, in effect, with the odd phenomenology of possessing a sex - to find some unabashed way of recognizing aloud that which is privately obvious; that any attention to the life of a woman, however it is traced in careful and elaborate description, must admit the degree to which the effects of gender are unpredictable and fleeting. (Perhaps the power of complaints about 'being treated as a sexual object' comes in part from experiences of the sudden violence of being pulled back into 'being a woman' by, say, shouts on the street you walk down, your thoughts 'elsewhere'.) And the question of how far anyone can take on the identity of being a woman in a thoroughgoing manner recalls aspects of the 'Active' status of sexual identities. Can anyone fully inhabit a gender without a degree of horror? How could someone 'be a woman' through and through, make a final home in that category without suffering claustrophobia - or hysteria? To lead a life soaked in the passionate consciousness of one's gender at every moment, to will to be a sex with a vengeance - impossibilities, and far from the aims of feminism. Then what is it to be a woman sometimes?

If being a woman is a condition which fluctuates for the individual, depending on what she considers to characterize it, then the historical aspects of the category are not far off. And if these held constant, political change for better or worse would be impossible. The answer to the question 'At this instant, am I a woman as distinct from an ungendered human being?' could bring into play three interrelated reflections on 'women'. The speaker's rejections of, adoptions of, or hesitations as to the Tightness of the self-description at that moment; the

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state of current political thinking on 'women' whether advanced by a feminism which will redescribe daily phenomena in gendered terms or by a vaster web of description carried in public policies, rhetorics, forms of contempt or sexualization; and then behind these, large and slow subsidings of the sexed categories, which are in part sedimented forms of the more rapidly fluctuating characterizations.

To suggest that there *are* such consolidations is somewhat different from work on the history of ideas *about* women - because nothing is assumed about an underlying continuity of real women above whose bodies changing aerial descriptions dance. If it is taken for granted that the category of women over time simply refers to a rather different content - Women Through the Ages - then the full historicity of what's at stake is lost. We'd miss the alterations in what 'women' are posed against - 'Nature', 'Class', 'Humanity', 'Reason' and other conceptions which do not form a still backdrop to changing depictions of gender. That air of a wearingly constant opposition of 'men' to 'women', for example, is an effect, in the exact forms of its monotony, of other great formations.

But this comment isn't preferred as if it had the power to melt away the phenomenon of sexual antagonism. To indicate a history for sexual consolidations doesn't spring from longing for a lost innocence, as if 'once', as John Donne wrote, 'Difference of sex no more wee knew / Than our Guardian Angells doe'.⁵ Nor is it a claim made in the hope of an Edenic future. To suggest that the polarity of men and women, the engaged and struggling couple, isn't timeless - this is not a gesture towards reconciliation as if once the two were allies, were less mercilessly distinct and may be so again if we stop insisting on tiresome difference, and only love each other calmly enough. The claim here is rather that the arrangements of people under the banners of 'men' and 'women', the forms of description which amass them as such, are enmeshed with histories of other concepts, including those of 'the social' and 'the body' (even though a conciliatory impulse may fire this claim). It follows that theories as to the timelessness of the binary opposition of sexual antagonism on the one hand, and appeals to the history of masculinity and femininity as ideas on the other, would both be modified by work which stands back from these approaches in favour of considering the historical nature of these massifications into gendered descriptions. (A Derridean commentator might say that the way to deal with the monotonous male/female opposition would be to effect an obliteration of difference into differences, and let that be an end to it. But this route, while economical, would also obliterate the forcefulness of *the air of* eternal polarity and its manifest effects.)

What kinds of enquiries might bear witness to the historical categorizations of the sexes and the peculiar temporality of 'women' within this? Most obviously, perhaps, the forms of the relation of 'woman' and her variants to a general humanity. Then the history of feminism in its necessarily ambiguous standing to the collectivity of 'women'. The emergence of new concepts after the Enlightenment and their implication with 'women' - chief among which, the idea of 'the social'. And, for example, the history of an increasing sexualization of 'women', a process whereby female persons become held to be saturated with

their sex, which invades their reasoning and spiritual faculties - this reaches a pitch of intensification in eighteenth-century Europe. Behind this, the whole history of the concept of the person, the individual in a more modern parlance, and the degree to which the soul, rational capacities and body of the person are distinct and how the changing forms of their sexualization operate. For the nineteenth century, arguments as to whether the concept of class is developed in a profoundly gendered manner. These are suggestions which might proliferate endlessly, but here I can only offer rough sketches of them.

'WOMEN' AND 'HUMAN'

The question of 'women' *vis-a-vis* humanity, for instance - from the 1790s the suffrage debates and campaigns mark the collective grouping of 'women' as newly thought political subjects in the west. How do 'women' emerge in this way? The impulse of feminism is often and not surprisingly to make a celebratory identification with the rush of Women on to the historical stage. Yet these 'emergences' have peculiar passages into life - they are the tips of their own icebergs. The more engaging question for feminism is then what lies beneath; to understand any conceptual collision which tosses up some novelty, you must know the nature of the pasts that have led up to it and allow these their full density of otherness. There are indeed no moments at which gender is utterly unvoiced. But the ways in which 'women' have always been there, spoken in advance of some more formally collectivized and prominent 'emergence', will be different, so that we can only decipher some newer articulation of 'women' by establishing what layers it is being spoken upon and against - by going around the back of the new outcropping to look for its foundations.

The long histories of suffrage battles do act as illustrations of the political temporality of 'women', which often borrows from the political speech it moves across. Demands for the franchise witness fluctuations, often rapid, between engagement with and disengagement from the broad category of 'Humanity' as an abstraction first to be exposed and permeated, and then to be denounced for its continued inadequacy and resolute proximity to the masculine. A history of comparative enfranchisement would always need to include a study of the points at which an unsexed Humanity is broken through political pressure into gendered blocs of men and women, or more often into humans and women; and then closes and reseals again at different political moments. This will not proceed at an identical pace for both sexes, and indeed in the history of European socialism, 'men' have often been argued through class terms as their route to the universally franchised Humanity.⁶ But for women to make their ascent to being numbered among the human may mark both a philosophical advance, and also the dawning of a tactical need to break yet again into a separately gendered designation. The changing fate of the ideal of a non-sexed social being of Humanity bears witness to such movements. When the name of feminism is in some temporary disgrace - in Britain after 1918, for instance - then it's 'Humanity' which takes on the mantle of progressive democracy, only to be torn apart again later on by resurgences of feminism in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the aim of emancipation, although it is voiced by and on behalf of

a particular sex, will periodically need to express itself as an imperative ethical demand in the name of a sex-blind humanism. (Most interesting here are the complications of the debates in Britain between socialist and feminist proponents of a universal adult suffrage, and feminists who supported instead a limited female suffrage; an insufficiently noticed array of arguments as to the best routes to civil democracy.)

DEGREES OF SEXUALIZATION AND FEMINIZATION

Whether or not 'Humanity' is a sexually democratic category is a speculation which can only be met by specific historical illustration; to clarify it would depend not only on the evidence of women's political emancipation during its various sways, but also on what Humanity as a concept is conjugated against. (This would also be so for the claims of humanity in relation to race and to class.) Its democratic possibilities would depend on, for example, how thoroughly at the time of its articulation the biological sex of a person was held to infuse his or her whole being - how fully characterized as belonging to a gender through and through the human being was. Thus a history of several categories is at once demanded.

What constitutes evidence for the suggestion that 'women' do undergo a broadly increasing degree of sexualization? To put dates to the long march of the empires of gender over the entirety of the person would be hard indeed. The modern nineteenth-century 'women' is clearly voiced in new ways by the developing human sciences of sociology, anthropology, demography, neurology, psychology, while a new social-sociological realm becomes both the ground and the vexation for feminism. The modern 'women' is arguably the result of long processes of closure which are hammered out by infinite numbers of mutual references from all sides of these studies and classifications - which are then both underwritten and cross-examined by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century feminisms which adopt, respecify, or dismiss these 'women'.

But this proliferating of gendered description within the human sciences is only one intensification of an older and less discriminating process. Such new typologies of being-as-women were preceded by a concentration in the course of the eighteenth century on a rabid femininity understood to colonize the female person. The seventeenth-century feminist, Mary Astell, would not tolerate appeals to Nature which masked the inflictions of Custom, and she called upon the democracy of the spiritual realm to secure justices without sexual prejudice. What would later pass as femininity was, she argued, learned and enforced; what women *are*, was not known. Yet as Nature, including the Nature of 'women', rose to the fore, so feminism after Mary Astell had a worse foe to contend with. The intricate processes of secularization and the march of a hundred variants of the natural had little in common but their lack of progressive implications for thinking the sexes' relations.

The mid-eighteenth-century Jansenist controversies in France before the expulsions of the Jesuits, for instance, looked back to an Augustinian view of the corruptibility of human nature, viewing the more leisurely Jesuitical attitude to earthly life and redemption with contempt. As Pascal said, only some were

allowed efficacious grace by God while the rest dwelt in the provenance of concupiscence. This represented a rigorous and unflinching anti-humanist position, while opposing perspectives were also framed as to emphasize the proximity of woman to Nature, yet not in a way which was beneficial. Utterly different convictions which appealed to the order of natural liberty and rights were nevertheless so framed as to exclude 'women' from the benevolent face of Nature. As the darkness in the soul suffered more and more feminizing, so natural right in the secular world had no interest in that equality of the soul to which the seventeenth-century feminist could lay claim. While there is nothing to be gained from setting about Rousseau's ears - that he offers no comfort to feminism is well enough known - his notoriously complex and idiosyncratic version of human nature also entailed a high degree of sexualization of that nature. That this is echoed in radically distinct quarters, that religious adherence, for young women especially, becomes increasingly eroticized in eighteenth-century novels - all these phenomena bring about a powerful and seamless entrenchment of a female nature which has displaced the soul, and close off the possibilities for radical arguments from its equality before God. It is not so much that a change in ideas *about* women and their natures has come about - but that 'women' carries a different weighting, that 'nature' represents different alignments and carries an intimacy of association with woman who is herself reconstructed by this and other rearrangements. Not only that entities are forced into new proximities with one another - but that they are so newly shot through with gender that a tacit *reconceptualization along sexed lines* has occurred.

'WOMEN' AND 'THE SOCIAL'

Another example: the associations of 'women' with 'the social' in the nineteenth century effect a kind of feminizing of the amorphous social at the same time as 'women' become a new sociological collectivity. 'The social question' in England *is* the question of the intimate conditions of working-class domestic life - housing, nutrition, budgets, maternal morbidity and malnutrition, infant mortality, childhood disease, wage-earning women and their dependents. Studies of poverty and family life, 'social conditions', are from the 1880s to the 1930s frequently explained as the ravages of deprivation on the family with the working-class woman as its pivot, its heart, but also as its ignorant saboteur. This closeness of 'women' and 'the social' is then refined and intensified by feminist, women's labour and philanthropic associations - who understand themselves as *women* investigators of the sufferings of the 'working-class woman'. This point is not made to undermine the usefulness or seriousness of, for example, the studies of the Fabian Women's Group, but to indicate the underlining of 'women' as agents and objects of social reform.

Yet one effect of this implicatedness of the social and the familial read through 'women' is its dislocation of the political. Once it is demarcated against the social, the political takes on an air of privacy and invulnerability, of 'high politics' associated with juridical and governmental power in a restricted sense. The ascent, in Britain, of some women to the franchise in 1918 and of all women

and men in 1928, does little to disturb this otherness of the political or to modify the tenacious proximity of 'women' to 'the social'. The phenomenon of women moral reformers has indeed received critical attention from historians, but the oddities of that 'social sphere', which engulfs them as it is defined, have largely escaped analysis.

'Women' become a social category in the modern sense when their place as newly mapped entities is established among the other collectivities which the nineteenth-century human sciences demand. 'Men' as a group do not of course undergo parallel realignments. Yet 'the social' comes to rely on 'man' but this time as its opposite which secures its own existence and balance. The couplet man/society, and the ensuing riddle of their relationship, becomes the hfe-stuff of anthropology, sociology, social psychology - the problem of how the individual is in the world. But if the social which partly encapsulates 'women' is then set against 'man' or the individual in this way, then the alignments of the sexes in 'society' are *conceptualized* as askew. It is not so much that 'women' are omitted as that they are too thoroughly included. They are not the submerged opposite of 'man', but something else.

For man in society has not undergone the same kind of immersion as has woman. He *faces* society, rather, a society which has already been permeated by the feminine (irrespective of whether women are tacitly included under 'man'). This philosophical opposition is a puzzle for nineteenth-century socialist philosophies contemplating historic, economic and social man. Hence the problem for Marxist philosophy of how to engage with the question of individualization. Marx in 1857 tried to effect an historicization of 'man' across different modes of production, because he wanted to save the political animal, Aristotle's man, from mutation into a timeless figure who has an extra-economic being, the Robinson Crusoe advanced by some political economies.⁷ But the stumbling-block for Marx's aim proved to be its assuming some prior, fully constituted 'man' who was then dragged through the transformations of history; this 'man' was already locked into his distinctiveness from the social, so he was already a thoroughly characterized and compromised figure.

As with man, so here, for once, with woman; no philosophical anthropology of woman can unfurl the mysteries it tries to solve, because that which is to be explicated - woman - stands innocently in advance of the task of discovering her. Historicizing across the means of production is not enough. What Marx writes about the category of Labour, though, might be claimed for sexual categorizations too, and for that dreadful air of constancy which sexual polarities possess:

The most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all. . . . Labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their validity - precisely because of their abstractness - for all epochs are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historical relations, and possess their full validity only for and within those relations.⁸

The temporalities suggested here aren't phenomena limited to 'women'. The

impermanence of collective identities in general is a hard problem for any emancipatory movement launched on the appeal to solidarity with the common cause, to a new group being. This will variously afflict forms of racial, national, occupational, class, religious, sexual consolidations; as you do not live your life evenly as a shop assistant, nor do you as a Greek Cypriot, and you can always refute your identity as such in the name of another description which, just because it is more individuated, will seem to ring more truthfully. (Or you skate across the several identifications which will take your weight, like Hanif Kureishi's suave character in the film *My Beautiful Laundrette*, who says, 'I'm a professional businessman, not a professional Pakistani.') The troubles of 'women', then, are not unique. But aren't they arguably peculiar in that 'women' do suffer from a heavy degree of characterization? It is true too that 'mothers' demonstrate this acutely, and interact with 'women' in the course of social-policy invocations particularly; in Britain after 1945, for instance, when 'women' were described either as 'mothers', over-feminized, or as 'workers', under-feminized, but the category of the working mother was impossible. So the general feminine description can be split and its elements played off against each other. But this only intensifies the excessively described nature of 'women'.

Feminism of late has emphasized that indeed 'women' are not racially or culturally homogeneous and it may be thought that this provides the proper answer to my hesitations about 'women'. But even though there is a helpful world of difference between, for example, making claims about a generalizing 'women' as against 'elderly Cantonese women in Soho' - attending to age, exile, trade, ethnicity and so forth - this isn't the same preoccupation. Any study of sexual consolidations, of the differing metaphorical weightings of 'women', would need to be alert to these refinements, but would not be satisfied by them. For however careful the description, it still comes to rest on 'women' and it's the isolation of this last instance which is in question.

It's not that a new slogan for feminism is being proposed here - of feminism without 'women'. Rather, what is proposed is that 'women' is a simultaneous foundation of and irritant to feminism, and this is constitutionally so. Indeed the trade-off for the myriad namings of 'women' by psychologies, politics and sociologies is that at this cost 'women' do become a force to be reckoned with. But the caveat is that none the less the risky elements to the processes of consolidation in sexed ranks are never very far away; the collectivity which distinguishes you may also be wielded, if often unintentionally, against you. Not just against you as an individual, that is, but also you as a social being. The dangerous intimacy between subjectification and subjection needs careful calibration. There is no fluent trajectory from feminism to a truly sexually democratic humanism, no quick passage from 'women' to 'humanity'. The study of the historical precipitations of these sexed abstractions helps to make sense of why not.

NOTES

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to 'Am I That Name?' *Feminism and the category of 'women' in history* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).

1 See Jacqueline Rose, 'Introduction - II', in J. Mitchell and J. Rose (eds), *Feminine Sexuality, Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne* (London: Macmillan, 1982).

2 See Stephen Heath, 'Male feminism', *Dalhousie Review*, 64, 2 (1986).

3 Jacques Derrida, *Spurs; Nietzsche's Styles* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5L 55-

4 See arguments in Lynne Segal, *Is the Future Female?* (London: Virago, forthcoming).

5 John Donne, 'The relique', *Poems* (London, 1633).

6 See Joan Scott, 'On language, gender and working-class history', *International Labor and Working Class History* (forthcoming, 1986).

7 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 83, 496.

8 *ibid.*, 104, 105.