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SUBMISSION AND READING

FEMININE MASOCHISM AND FEMINIST CRITICISM

One morning, in the early hours, Dr Daniel Paul Schreber half awakens, and, whilst 'in a state between sleeping and waking', cannot stop himself from thinking 'that after all it really must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation'.¹ This twilight vision of the delights of submission is the germ from which Judge Schreber's whole theological system grows. It was summed up - indeed, credited - by the court which gave him his freedom from incarceration:

He believed that he had a mission to redeem the world and to restore it to its lost state of bliss. This, however, he could only bring about if he were first transformed from a man into a woman.²

Schreber's becoming a woman is necessary to that attainment of bliss. And the woman he was to become - or to be 'represented as'³ - is indeed none other than the bride of God. According to Freud's analysis, Schreber's illness reaped its victory from transforming his castration anxiety into castration desire: he actually *wanted* to become castrated - that is, for Freud, to become 'a woman' - and moreover this is actively required by his theory of salvation. No one can attain 'bliss' unless Schreber-the-woman has first been 'given over to (feminine) voluptuousness'. What Schreber wishes to submit to is something he perceives only the feminine has access to: the possibility of submission itself.

Schreber's 'deluded' notion of bliss might also be what is described by continental theories of feminine *jouissance*. A very similar 'experience' is evoked by Barthes in *The Pleasure of the Text*. Having begun by quoting Nietzsche from *The Gay Science* on the possibility of an affirmation without negation, Barthes offers us a figure - perhaps even Schreber himself - who takes his pleasure to such an excess that even asylums are forced to release him:

Such a man would be the mockery of our society: court, school, asylum, polite conversation would cast him out: who endures contradiction without shame? Now this anti-hero exists: he is the reader of the text at the moment he takes his pleasure.⁴

A possibility of revolutionary *excess* exists, then, for Barthes, in the simple act

of reading. The reader, it seems, cannot be 'contained', identified, territorialized. This reader is precisely 'the one' who escapes delineating inscription.

I want to look at the point at which these two texts intersect, at the encounter between Schreber on feminine submission and Barthes on blissful reading. What is at stake in this evocation of the possibility of submission? What does it tell us about enslavement, about feminine masochism, and about reading? Is there such a thing as submission which is not *to* something, which does not have enslavement implicated within it?

The feminist discussion of this problem could be understood as turning upon various interpretations of the word 'selflessness'. What we commonly understand by the term masochism is a self-abnegation: the desire to have oneself put down in the bedroom and the boardroom. An early feminist cry countered this with a glorious call for selfishness. The notion of feminine *jouissance* celebrates, equally gloriously, another selflessness, the affirmation of 'bliss' and the dissolution of sexual identity. Perhaps it is the same difficult path which feminism has marked out in its negotiation of these interpretations of 'selflessness' which needs to be followed in feminist criticism's negotiation of the terrain and language of reading.

Critics talk of reading, and of pleasure in the text. Psychoanalysis talks of masochism, of pleasure in pain. It is clear that since Freud formulated his theory of the death drive, to which his discussion of masochism contributed, we cannot discuss pleasure - readerly, writerly, or otherwise - without discussing pleasure in pain. We cannot, therefore, properly discuss pleasure in the text without accounting for pleasure in the *pain* of text,² a reading pleasure which is also a kind of erotogenic masochism - the offering up of one's self as slave to the text. I want here to explore both that type of reading pleasure, and also another which is a submission of an entirely 'other' kind - an 'active' selflessness - in order to suggest some implications of an encounter with the theory of the death drive for feminist critical theory.

MASOCHISM AND READING: THE CASE OF LAWRENCE

Feminists also talk of masochism, and any discussion of the future of feminism today means encountering it again. Has the desperate question put to Germaine Greer at a conference Maria Marcus attended yet been answered?

But how can we start a women's movement when I bet three-quarters of us sitting in this room are masochists?⁵

How indeed? One of my interests is the question of feminine masochism and reading, of why (some) women find pleasure in reading misogynistic texts, or texts which may be pernicious to them. I came up against this while working on feminist readings of D. H. Lawrence, written since Kate Milieu's polemic against him in *Sexual Politics*. What happens when a woman, and particularly a feminist, reads with pleasure an account of a woman being torn apart? This is the problem which, rearticulated in terms of cinema, becomes the possibility that a woman might pleasurably, actively, but nevertheless masochistically,

identify with the representation of woman as spectacle. Milieu's reading of Lawrence takes off from her reading of feminine masochism in Freud. Freud and Lawrence are, it seems, partners in crime, Lawrence ideologically reinforcing and culturally prescribing the mechanism which, paradoxically, Milieu's Freud takes to be 'innately' womanly. Rather than finishing Lawrence off, however, Milieu's text engendered a vehement debate between feminist readers in the 1980s which has polarized into a question of prosecution and defence, for and against Lawrence as arch-MCP; perhaps even, in Norman Mailer's words, feminist criticism as 'putting men on trial'. Some followed Millett in putting the boot in. Others, confessing an adolescent infatuation with the man, have revealed ambivalences even as they write, giving the impression that they have, like Schreber, half awakened in the night and found themselves thinking about how nice it would be to be a Lawrentian heroine submitting to Dark Masculinity. These, then, are guilty pleasures in textual brutalities. Other readers engage, as one critic puts it, in a simple and ruthless selectivity between the political and the poetic:

even those women who admire the way in which Lawrence uses words are quick to add that they feel nothing but contempt for the way in which he uses women.⁶

But can we really be so selective? Following the dictum that the personal is the political, feminist criticism has largely been a history of accounting for the political in the poetic. So I was interested in finding out what was at stake in a critical acknowledgement of the political dubiousity of certain passages of Lawrence's corpus. What does it mean for women to be attracted by certain types of writing which may be against their feminist convictions? Maria Marcus imagines the reception of *A Taste for Pain* in a torrent of tabloid headlines such as 'Women's Libber Admits She's A Masochist'. If criticism ever caught the headlines, perhaps these women readers would be met one morning with 'Feminist Critic Admits She Likes D. H. Lawrence'. Are the two situations the same? Do some women, who happen to be feminists, like D. H. Lawrence *because of* the way he writes about women or *despite* it? Is there a direct correlation between Lawrence's narrative sadism and women's readerly masochism? Again, according to Mailer's outrageous implication, did his work hold 'huge fascination for women' as a *consequence of* his readiness 'to see them murdered'?⁷

The pursuit of these issues has led me on to wider questions, about dissolute and dissolving readings. What is implied by a notion of authorial sadism? Is it something to do with the malicious and duplicitous will of the man who penned the book? Millett comes close to this conspiracy theory of intentionality in her reading, as did much early 'images of women' criticism. Perhaps we should rather be talking about a sadistic *text* which engenders a masochistic reader? Or can textual sadism be inferred from the existence of a reading which hurts? Nietzsche acknowledges the possibility of pain in reading when he points to the feelings of 'we' moderns when 'today we read *Don*

Quixote with a bitter taste in our mouths, almost with a feeling of torment'.⁸ Is this bitter taste the symptom of a sadistic text at work?

A debate similar to that on Lawrence among feminists has revolved around Sade, and the status of his sadism. For Bataille, Sade's sadism is not a 'personal' psychosexual condition which can be diagnosed through an analysis of representations of violence within the narrative - as Freud diagnoses Schreber through his autobiography. Rather, it lies in the effect he produces on his reader. De Sade's sadism is not primarily a question of the 'real' dismemberment of his lovers, or even of such descriptions in the text - the violent dismemberment of characters. It is 'we readers' who are dismembered, decomposed, 'discomposed'.

Nobody, unless he is totally deaf to it, can finish *Les Cent Vingts Journees de Sodome* without feeling sick: the sickest of all is he who is sexually excited by the book. . . .It stifles us and, instead of creating in us a feeling of acute pain, it creates an emotion which discomposes - and kills.⁹

Although this is couched in a high moral gloss (quite uncharacteristic if we read it in the context of Bataille's other work on the affirmation of sacrifice), the implication that writing can be murder is clear. Who, then, or what is being killed? It seems that one of the things which writing is about is the discomposition of the reader.

And what of the opposite of this, Barthes's Utopia of reading, the urge to unbounded and energetic 'life' in the *jouissance* of the text with which we began? This is writing which calls us to submit to it, but 'blissfully', as Schreber submits, sexually and divinely.

Text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts . . . unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his states, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relations with language.¹⁰

The juxtaposition of these quotations from Bataille and Barthes reiterates the two possibilities of 'selflessness' with which I began, suggesting selflessness in *reading* rather than in various manifestations of female experience. Bataille evokes a reading self which has its self forcibly and painfully 'discomposed'. Superimpose this on to certain feminist critiques of masochism and you get the female self which is culturally 'composed' in order to be 'discomposed' by the conspiratorial structures of patriarchal culture. Barthes's is a self which, in its blissful experience of reading, loses its self and sense of boundaries. This is liberation criticism rather like the liberation politics of *jouissance* which ostensibly 'unsettles the [woman's] historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of [her] states, values, memories, brings to a crisis [her] relations with language'.

This is essentially a reiteration of the links already forged between readings and sexual politics, which is necessary in order to lay out the terrain of this brief discussion of the critical implications of masochism and the theory of the

death drive. All of these examples are perhaps rather warped types of reception theory. First we have the possibility of feminist readers who guiltily like reading Lawrence. Then we have a notion of the violent decomposition and dismemberment of the reader of Sade. And finally, Barthes's 'boudoir' of reading, the pleasures of the text which Eagleton has called 'the masochistic thrills of feeling [the reader's] self shattered and dispersed through the tangled webs of the work itself'.¹¹ The key to my argument here lies, I think, in Barthes's phrase, 'the text that imposes a state of loss'. What is the nature of this loss? Who loses and who wins? What, then, is at stake in the notion of submission in Freud, and what is the relationship between the desire to submit to pain and the desire at work in certain readings, of certain texts, or of reading *per se*? Do we submit to texts as Schreber imagines a woman submits to a man, or the bride of Christ to the Godhead?

SECONDARY MASOCHISM

Why should Schreber think that to be a woman submitting to a man is so delicious? Can this desire, and Schreber's will to be transformed into a woman, tell feminism anything today?

In 'The economic problem of masochism', Freud notes that 'the masochist wants to be treated like a small and helpless child, but, particularly, like a naughty child'.¹² The masochist, in short, wants to be irresponsible. Maria Marcus quite agrees. Her desire was to be 'done to', to find a man who would steal her agency, who would make her be "*someone who wasn't anything in herself*, who did not deal with things, but who was dealt with'.¹³ The feeling which came upon her as a result was '*something definite* over which I simply didn't have any control'.¹⁴

For feminists like Marcus, the sexual politics of her relationships is indeed dubious, as dubious as the enjoyment of certain passages in Lawrence. In her sexual life she wants to have no control, in order to be taken to a point at which she, and indeed anyone else, necessarily and quite radically has no control. For the language she uses to discuss a man's man-handling of her is the language of *jouissance* itself. Pleasure 'comes' at the point at which one knows one can no longer help oneself, at the point of the dissolution of agency, when one is 'dealt with' by desire, when 'a state of loss' is 'imposed' upon one. Marcus confirms that her sexual life is characterized by a Hegelian tragedy of masters and slaves, in which she masochistically desires that her agency be actively denied by 'one' who sadistically asserts his agency over her. The problem of who is submitting to whom again rears its ugly and all too familiar head, as her desire defeats itself in the realization that, in ensuring that 'he' dominates her, she has in fact been controlling the situation all along. 'The slave must first instruct the master.'

I gradually discovered that I was really being the consumer and he the supplier. I discovered how amazingly self-centred a masochist is. Everything was to do with me, me, me I am really the one being served and waited on. I am really the main character. I am the one who must receive the right to service to enable me to imagine that I am nothing.¹⁵

She dominates the one she would have dominate her. She is responsible for the situation which would take her to irresponsibility. This is what Jessica Benjamin calls 'rational violence' in her discussion of *The Story of O* and Hegel:¹⁶ it is the impossible desire both for submission and recognition. The masochist requires the other to be in control — in other words, it is the masochist who controls the other's control.

It is this phenomenon which Freud terms secondary masochism. In Nietzsche's terms, it is a desire which is reactive rather than active. Perhaps the difference between the 'blissful' submission of one's personal identity and the masochist's negative offering up of the self to pain or to a sadist can be understood as the difference between primary and secondary masochism for Freud. Confusingly, at different moments in his corpus, Freud argues that masochism is both a primary and a secondary drive. In 'Instincts and their vicissitudes' he sets up a model in which sadism is active, and masochism is an inversion of it.

*The turning round of an instinct upon the subject's own self is made plausible by the reflection that masochism is actually sadism turned round upon the subject's own ego.*¹⁷

Secondary masochism, then, is not simply a will to self-torture, but a will to 'pleasure' in pain, which would normally be projected outwards but has been deflected back on to the self. In this arguably most Hegelian of Freud's essays, masochism could be understood to 'contain' the activity of sadism. Masochism is, then, an example of the 'reversal of an instinct into its opposite'.¹⁸

Almost by definition, secondary masochism needs recognition. It is the reception of the force of primary sadism which was originally thrust outwards and then deflected back on to the self; the intermediary state between primal sadism, which needs no other, and the sadism we understand as requiring the other to feel pain. For Freud, here, there are three stages of active and reactive sexuality which are superimposed upon the terms sadism and masochism. There is primary sadism, and then masochism, which is a secondary inversion of sadism, and then a sadism which is indeed a will to torture and which is thrown up as a response to masochism. But so far, no such thing as primary masochism. This is confirmed in 'A child is being beaten':

To begin with, there seems to be a confirmation of the view that masochism is not the manifestation of a primary instinct, but originates from sadism which has been turned round upon the self - that is to say, by means of regression from an object to the ego.¹⁹

PRIMARY MASOCHISM, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

In 'Beyond the pleasure principle', written in the same year as 'A child is being beaten', however, Freud confusingly admits that exactly the reverse of this may in fact be true:

The account that was formerly given of masochism requires emendation as being too sweeping in one respect: there *might* be such a thing as primary masochism - a possibility which I had contested at that time.²⁰

We get little more explicitly from Freud on the subject, but this is nevertheless the aspect of his work on masochism which I am interested in, even though the notion of primary masochism complicates things considerably for any prospective political analysis. (That may be why subsequent work on masochism has concentrated upon it as a secondary phenomenon.) If masochism is the inversion of a primal, outward thrusting energy, then according to Karen Horney we must look at what forces that energy back, destructively, on to the woman herself.

The problem of feminine masochism cannot be related to factors inherent in the anatomical-physiological-psychic characteristics of woman alone, but must be considered as importantly conditioned by the culture complex or social organisation in which the particular masochistic woman has developed.²¹

This is similar to Reich's reduction of the death drive *per se* to a symptom of Freud's personal psychic disease, the individual quirk of a sick man: masochism may be an important symptom of a culture's inadequate 'mental hygiene', in Reich's words, but as 'primary' - in the sense in which it is a model of the essentially conservative desire of the drive to return to its origins - it is denied. For Reich, there is no 'primary' instinct 'uncontaminated' by the 'outside'; the death drive is 'not something the organism wants. It's something that happens to the organism. Therefore, it is not an "instinct".²² In Horney's cultural analysis, a similar process of bracketing reinforces a crude distinction between the psychic and the social, the personal and the political, the inside and the outside. Her essays of 1926 and 1935, 'The flight from womanhood' and 'The problem of feminine masochism', partly set the agenda for feminist accounts of the problem of masochism. As has been pointed out,²³ contemporary radical feminist critiques of psychoanalysis are largely foreshadowed by the London school's critique of Vienna school psychoanalysis which took place in the 1930s. For instance, Horney's emphasis upon 'the weight of social conditionings in the genesis of any sex-limited peculiarities in the distribution of masochistic trends'²⁴ could be seen as the ancestor of such recent texts as Paula Caplan's *The Myth of Women's Masochism*. Horney's notion that society favours masochistic attitudes in women and discourages them in men²⁵ forms the basis of much second-wave feminist critique. And Marcus thanks her for writing that 'cultural factors exert a powerful influence on women; so much so . . . that in our culture it is hard to see how any women can escape becoming masochistic'.²⁶

So masochism remains a thorny and shameful issue, an unspeakable testament to a certain state of feminist false consciousness in women, or painful proof of the conspiracy which has caused us pragmatically to enjoy our lot. This crystallizes into the argument that masochism is a supremely

reasonable response to social control mechanisms which enforce it, an argument which reinforces those very notions of common sense which have been so pernicious to women, and entirely undercuts psychoanalysis's anti-empiricistic project. This characteristically Anglo-Saxon move can be illustrated, again in terms of the Schreber case, by Morton Schatzman's reading of it in *Soul Murder: Persecution in the Family*. Schatzman's thesis is that Schreber's illness was an eminently understandable response to the repressive practices of his father. The brutal inscriptions upon the child are inevitably paid for in adulthood, when pain is cashed in for a range of abnormal symptoms. Ironically enough, the neatness of Schatzman's existential economy itself violently harnesses the excesses of Schreber's 'experiences', which, rationalized, become simply elaborate and imaginative forms of common sense. On a textual level, this slippage is discussed by C. Barry Chabot, in an analysis of the Schreber case as literary criticism, as 'the displacement of the problematics and uncertainty of *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* by the apparent lucidity and tangibility of actual historical events'.²⁷

Jessica Benjamin notes a similar set of evasions occurring in readings of *The Story of O*:

The story of O's masochism is not seen as an allegory of the desire for recognition but simply as the story of a woman victimized - too weak or brainwashed or hopeless to resist her degradation. Such a viewpoint cannot, of course, explain what satisfaction is sought and found in submission, what psychological motivations lead to oppression, humiliation, or subservience. Instead it seeks to deny the unpleasant fact that people really do consent to relationships of domination, and that fantasies of domination play a vigorous part in the mental lives of those who do not actually do so.²⁸

Perhaps the question of masochism for feminists is that of pleasure *as* danger, of why sexual danger should be pleasurable, rather than one which attempts to secure safe pleasures *despite* the dangers of the sexual minefield. For all the problems of Helene Deutsch's piece on masochism, I think we need to follow her emphasis on 'analysis' as that which 'comes to know the human mind in its discords rather than its harmonies'.²⁹ The fact that masochism strikes the wrong note with certain feminisms serves only to underline the need for a means of analysis which can account for psychic discord.

YES MEANS YES AND NO MEANS YES: FEMINISM AND AFFIRMATION

I am not arguing for a more positive reading of secondary masochism, a defence of 'different favours' as Benjamin calls them. But an understanding of what is at stake in the notion of Freudian desire, of whether it is the model of 'pure' submission, needs to be reached before we can analyse the 'discordant' gender specificity of certain types of submission, textual or sexual, which culturally, and in terms of individualized psyches, require recognition or enslavement. The masochist says Yes to experiences to which 'any normal person' would say No. The masochist finds, with Schreber, that it is very nice

to submit, as or like a good woman. If we accept that desire ultimately 'wants' radical non-agency - the inorganic, according to the model of desire afforded by Freud's theory of the death drive - we must say that to desire is to lose one's agency. For desire, in so far as it is experienced by the subject, is the longing for the abolition of the subject. Desire is non-agency; it is the dissolution of subjectivity. Secondary masochism shadows it in that it is the desire to lose one's agency to another agent, horribly parodying the affirmative nature of the Freudian unconscious.

This may be briefly clarified in terms of a discussion of the status of negation in Freud and feminist responses to it. Primary masochism is perhaps the desire to say Yes to everything. Secondary masochism says Yes to pain. For Freud, the unconscious doesn't know how to say No. A famous feminist anthem succinctly paraphrases a characteristic radical feminist response to this: 'However we dress / Wherever we go / Yes means Yes / And No means No.' On the level of fantasy, the Freudian unconscious would rewrite the last two lines as, 'Yes Means Yes / And No Means Yes', obviously causing problems for feminists, which are particularly foregrounded in the 'Dora' case. In that text, Freud's assertion that 'there is no such thing as an unconscious No' is placed in tandem with an aggressive rewriting of Dora's words on her behalf. When Dora, appropriately, says No, Freud says that she is really saying 'Yes, I was unconscious of that',³⁰ a rewriting guaranteed to enrage those keen to reinscribe this modernist heroine with a workable resource of personal agency, and the *right* to say No.

Freud undoubtedly made a tactical error here, but this should not be taken as a whole strategic policy. To be no longer in a position to say No - the position one 'submits' to - is undoubtedly disturbing, a difficult notion for women to affirm today. To be no longer in a position to say No is to be no longer able to utter negatives or be heard: to be in a place where, as Freud writes in the Wolf Man case, 'No does not exist'. This place is, for Freud, the unconscious. For Nietzsche, who begins *The Pleasure in the Text*, it is the possibility of an affirmation of affirmation, an escape from economies of negation or recognition. His cry 'Amor fati', an erotic submission to fate, precedes the section which Barthes includes as his epigraph:

let [fate] be my love henceforth! . . . I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. *Looking away* shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer.³¹

This 'position' is, then, quite active. In saying Yes to the text of one's fate one does not submit *to something* - *to an identity*. One is, perhaps, less violable.

This is, I think, the dissolution of identity which spills over for Schreber, for Barthes, into ecstasy. Ecstasy is literally and etymologically the state of being outside of oneself: *ex* (outside) + *histania* (place). An ecstatic reading is, then, the possibility of entering a space where one's identity dissolves: one is transported. Schatzman interestingly marks a distinction between persecution and paranoia, persecution being what one existentially *feels*, whilst paranoia is a state which is imposed upon one from the outside, forcing one's whole self to

split into a self which feels persecuted and a self which 'adopts a position of otherness in relation to his own experience',³² in Sartrean terms, a form of 'bad faith'. Re-reading Schreber's *Memoirs* and the Freud Case, I would supplement and subvert this duality with a possibility of ecstasy which exceeds an economy of selves and others. For Schreber, femininity 'is' this. For Barthes, reading 'is' this. Schreber is 'sick' because he retains a memory of masculine identity which reads this access to ecstasy paranoiacally. Freud finds in Schreber's desire a passive homosexuality which has engendered paranoia. There is indeed, etymologically, a close relationship between paranoia and ecstasy. If ecstasy is to be outside of oneself, then paranoia is to be literally beside oneself: *para* (alongside, beyond) + *noos, nous* (mind). In a sense paranoia can be understood to be ecstasy experienced from 'within', ecstasy which still fears the loss of the self, which has to be 'beside itself but also has a desperate need to maintain the boundaries of its self's territories.

Is there, then, a desire to submit in reading which is quite other than the desire to be enslaved by the text? I have suggested that the difference between these desires could be marked out as the sense in which primary masochism is 'quite other than' secondary masochism. To extrapolate on to Barthes's model, pleasurable reading would still lay one open to abuse by structures of identity and recognition:

the Text of pleasure contents, fills, grants euphoria . . . comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a *comfortable* practice of reading.³³

However, to understand a text in its movement, its crucial non-identities and desires, it is not enough to exult in Barthes's 'boudoir' of reading. Rather, one must seek out readings, like the death drive, which are quite 'uncomfortable'.

Isobel Armstrong ends her recent diary of a feminist reading of Christina Rossetti: 'Perhaps we need a gendered account of pleasure.'³⁴ My response is that we *definitely* need a gendered account of pleasure, which would require us to be, in her words, not only discomfited but 'undignified'. This will, I think, involve a thorough discussion of the death drive and how it is lived out by different sexualities in their readings and writings.

NOTES

This article was first given as a talk at the Feminist Criticism conference at Southampton University, July 1988.

1 Sigmund Freud, 'Psychoanalytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (Schreber)' (1911 [1910]), in *Case Histories 2*, Pelican Freud Library (PFL), vol. 9 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 142.

2 *ibid*, 146.

3 *ibid*, 19.

4 Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. Richard Miller (London: Cape, 1976), 3.

5 Maria Marcus, epigraph to *A Taste for Pain*, trans. Joan Tate (London: Souvenir 1981).

6 Lydia Blanchard, 'Love and power: a reconsideration of sexual politics in D. H. Lawrence', *Modern Fiction Studies*, 21, 3 (1975/6), 431.

- 7 Norman Mailer, *The Prisoner of Sex* (London: 1971), 134.
- 8 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 1969), 66.
- 9 Georges Bataille, *Literature and Evil* (1957), trans. Alastair Hamilton (London: Calder & Boyars 1973), 99.
- 10 Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, 14.
- 11 Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: an introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 83.
- 12 Sigmund Freud, 'The economic problem of masochism' (1924), in *On Metapsychology*, PFL, vol. 11 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984).
- 13 Marcus, *A Taste for Pain*, 61.
- 14 *ibid.*, 15.
- 15 *ibid.*, 123.
- 16 Jessica Benjamin, 'Master and slave: the fantasy of erotic domination', in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson (eds), *Desire: the politics of sexuality* (London: Virago 1983), 292.
- 17 Sigmund Freud, 'Instincts and their vicissitudes' (1915), in *On Metapsychology*, 124.
- 18 *ibid.*, 124.
- 19 Sigmund Freud, 'A child is being beaten' (1919), in *On Psychopathology*, PFL, vol. 10 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 180.
- 20 Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the pleasure principle', in *On Metapsychology*, 328.
- 21 Karen Homey, 'The problem of feminine masochism' (1935), in Jean Baker Miller (ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Women* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 38.
- 22 Wilhelm Reich, *Reich Speaks of Freud*, ed. Mary Higgins and Chester M. Raphael (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 85.
- 23 See, for instance, Juliet Mitchell, 'Freud, the Freudians and the psychology of women', in *Women and Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), and Jacqueline Rose, 'Feminism and the psychic' and 'Femininity and its discontents', in *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 1986).
- 24 Homey, 'The problem . . .', 21.
- 25 *ibid.*, 36.
- 26 *ibid.*, 36-7; Marcus, *A Taste for Pain*, 190.
- 27 C. Barry Chabot, *Freud on Schreber* (Amherst, Mass.: 1982), 61.
- 28 Benjamin, 'Master and slave . . .', 297.
- 29 Helene Deutsch, 'The significance of masochism in the mental life of women' (1930), in Robert Fliess (ed.), *The Psychoanalytic Reader* (New York: 1973), 195.
- 30 Sigmund Freud, 'Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria ("Dora")' (1905 [1901]), in *Case Histories I*, PFL, vol. 8 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), 92ff.
- 31 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (1882-3), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 1977), 223.
- 32 'Many people feel persecuted, but no one ever feels paranoid. Paranoia is not an experience; it is an attribution one person makes about another. It is a judgment that someone else's feelings of persecution do not refer to anything real. The person feeling persecuted believes what he feels persecuted by *is* real. Of course someone may say about himself "I'm paranoid", but in doing so he adopts a position of otherness in relation to his own experience. He becomes, as it were, both another person, looking at and judging his experience "objectively", and an object, looked at and judged.' Morton Schatzman, *Soul Murder* (London: 1973), 130.
- 33 Barthes, *The Pleasures of the Text*, 14.
- 34 Isobel Armstrong, 'Diary of a reading of Christina Rossetti', in Sue Rose (ed.), *Women Reading Women's Writing* (Brighton: Harvester, 1988).