The idea that our society is classless, or is tending to become classless, exercises an increasingly pervasive influence upon socialist discussion, in *Universities and Left Review* as powerfully as anywhere else. Perhaps it is too early to speak of it as a "theory": the idea has only been discussed explicitly by Richard Hoggart in *The Uses of Literacy* and *Conviction* and by Stuart Hall in "A Sense of Classlessness" (*U.L.R.* 5), and it has not yet been related to other kinds of social analysis, so that in our own pages it coexists—somewhat uneasily I feel—with *The Insiders* and *The Controllers.* Nevertheless, the idea conveniently describes the trend of a good deal of recent discussion and so it seems worth considering as a theory about social change in our society.

The theory of classlessness sets up a *status* model of contemporary society in which description of "competing styles of life" and "Keeping up with the Joneses" largely displaces structural analysis of the society. The contours of the English class system are dissolved before the minutiae of status differentiation. And it sets this status model up against a *class* model of nineteenth-century society which is drastically simplified to leave out of account the importance of status and the extraordinarily complex processes through which class consciousness was formed. In this article I shall start by discussing the nineteenth-century model: I will suggest that the picture of the nineteenth-century capitalist as industrial primitive is no more exact than the picture of the contemporary capitalist as Glad Hander. I shall then try to show that the working-class community was formed against pressures markedly similar to those upon which attention is focused today (opportunity, mobility, Mass Media), I
Hall's description of the working-class community. Finally, I discuss Stuart Hall's description of the working-class community.

**VICTORIAN CAPITALISM**

Stuart Hall follows Riesman's model of the change from "Invisible Hand" to "Glad Hand," from the brutality of the industrial revolution to the capitalism of mass consumption and mass persuasion:

"With the growth of the joint stock firm or corporation, the whole nature of private property has been revolutionised. It can no longer be identified or personalised in the shape of the single industrial magnate, the 'robber baron' or even the entrepreneurial family. The maximisation of profit is still the motive driving behind the system, but because of the stability of the firm it can only be considered over a much longer period of growth."

This had led to a revolution in the character of industrial relations. In place of "the brutalised working class working within a severe labour discipline" modern industry has produced

"the shift which Riesman remarks on as shift from 'the hardness of matter to the softness of men'. . . . the development is towards the personalisation of work, through guided participation, excluding ownership, from above."

Stuart Hall's image of nineteenth-century capitalism is extrapolated from the descriptive parts of Marx's *Capital* which describes, in the main, the period of primitive capitalist accumulation; they apply in the main to the period, before 1843, when industrial capitalism was not yet matured. They depict a special kind of barbarism which was peculiar to the industrial revolution in its formative and most primitive period. The early industrial revolution was the work of small entrepreneurs, under-capitalised and faced with fierce competition. Consequently they sought to maintain their position by lengthening working hours, intensifying the rhythm of work, imposing savage labour discipline upon the newly recruited labour force, and employing ever-poorer grades of labour (women and children). But a great change came over the economy in the Eighteen Forties. In the terrible crisis of 1839-42 many of the smaller firms typical of the early period went to the wall. From 1843 the railway boom promoted companies and industries of a new type. The railway companies associated, for the first time, the industrialists of the north with the merchants and banking capital of London. After the initial "mania" they became the first really stable institutions of industrial capitalism and they set the pattern for the development of firms which were dependent upon capital equipment, rather than upon forcing extra working effort and hours.

With the consequent "growth in the stability of the firm" the face of capitalism changed. The successful capitalist was able to accept the regulation of the hours of labour (Ten Hour Day, etc.) and to discard the wild-cat methods of his predecessors. Indeed, the Glad Hand seems always to have been a feature of the successful firm: before the Victorian period such successful employers as the Boultons, the Watts and the Crossleys all had humane labour codes and schemes of education improvement and social welfare, and it is recorded of the Birmingham employers, who enjoyed a greater prosperity than the industrial north, that they were "experts in the sort of personnel relations that have become professionalised in the twentieth century." The newspapers of the 1830's and 1840's were full of reports and advertisements of week-end trips and "entertainments sponsored by firms for their employees."

**VICTORIAN "OPEN SOCIETY"**

In the theory of classlessness the traditional working-class community is being disintegrated: in the new society, by the pressures of geographical and social mobility, and by the impact of the Mass Media and status differentiation. What is overlooked is that the "traditional" working-class communities were formed against just these hostile pressures.

In many ways the Victorian society was more genuinely "open" than our own. There was far more movement of people in the nineteenth century than at any other time in our history. From the 1820's there was the massive Irish immigration into the largest urban centres—into Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and the East End. In the 'Thirties and 'Forties, and again in the 'Eighties, there was the wave-like movement from country to town and from town to city. There was the "tramp" for employment or for higher wages which until late in the century was part of the normal experience of the Victorian artisan. When the movement into the heart of the cities began to slacken in the 'Eighties it was replaced by the movement into the newer suburbs. Bethnal Green is often thought of as a typical "closed" working-class community, but as late as 1888 Llewellyn Smith could write of it:

"Why is there so little local life and sentiment in East London? Why is it hardly possible to conceive an excited throng crying 'Well played, Bethnal Green,' with the same spirit which nerves the men of Bradford to crowd enthusiastically to the football field on a cold and drizzling November afternoon?"

There was, in addition to internal migration, far more working-class emigration, both short term and permanent, than there is today. Short-term emigration was a common way of getting on in the world: it offered the artisan the possibility of high wages and considerable savings with which he might, on his return, set up home or even start a small business. Already in the 'Thirties Cobden adjured the working class to "make themselves free of the labour market of the world, and thus they can do by accumulating £20 each, which will give them command of the only market in which labour is at a higher rate than in England—I mean that of the United States. If every working man would save this sum he might be as independent of his employer as the latter, with his great capital, is of his workers."

In the second half of the century Britain financed and managed the railway booms in India, in the United States, in South America, and the Victorian artisans were to be found in great demand all over the world. Only with the contraction of overseas investments after the Great War...
did this externalised working-class mobility decline in importance.

Nineteenth-century capitalism offered to many skilled workers a range of genuine opportunities for self-advancement. Upward mobility was a far more common experience than it is today, for the dividing line between the worker and the employer was much less closely defined. In many industries the system of sub-contract and "co-exploitation" offered the skilled worker a kind of participation in the division of profits. It was quite common for the artisan to set up as an independent master, often more or less self-employed but quite frequently too as master of a small workshop. In industries such as steel and cotton where a large unit size made it difficult for new entrants to set up on their own, the skilled worker could at least rise to the highest managerial positions. The holding of trade union office was another common means of self-advancement. Robert Applegarth, the representative type of mid-Victorian trade unionist, set up, on his retirement, as the owner of a metal engraving firm, and Tom Mann set up as a publican in Long Acre after the 1889 Dock Strike. Eric Hobsbawm, in his study of The Labour Aristocracy found it "quite common to see the militant trades union negotiator appearing, in his later life, as the dogmatic defender of 'freedom of labour.'"

In the "open" Victorian society status striving was certainly as important as today, and much more powerful in a working-class community divided between the skilled artisan and the unskilled labourer. Thomas Wright, the journeyman engineer, wrote in 1873 that "Artisans wives hold the wives of labourers to be of a lower social grade, and very often will either not 'neighbour' them at all, or else in a patronising way." And differential consumption powerfully reinforced such status divisions. When the period of primitive accumulation gave way to the affluent society of mid-Victorian England a section of the working class was lifted, for the first time, away from the poverty line. Where this new experience was confined to a minority of the working class, and where the margin separating the worker from poverty was so much narrower, the consumption of non-essential commodities was a much more powerful dissolver of class consciousness than it is today. The piano in the front parlour was a far more powerful index of status than any of the more diversified ranges of household goods that are almost universally consumed today.

The National Review in 1863 anticipated some recent comments on the effects of prosperity when it wrote: "For some years the masses have been singularly unwilling to move. They have given up the Charter, given up voting to a most annoying extent, and turned with interest and avidity to schemes of social improvement. The middle class sympathise with the lower in their craving for physical comfort. They will not concede them power, but they will go to almost any length to improve their material conditions." Thus working-class community and the Labour Movement were built up in face of hostile pressures at least as strong as those which exist today.

**VICTORIAN ENGINEERS OF CONSENT**

ONE of Riesman's polar comparisons is between the "job-mindedness" of the nineteenth century and the "people-minded" capitalism of today. The "new capitalism" depends for its strength upon its means of manipulation and persuasion. Stuart Hall writes that the sense of classlessness "can only be engendered by the persuasive use of a formula" and "must exist before people will accept their own cultural and economic exploitation." And he sees this taking place through the Mass Media which are now "not peripheral to the 'economic base,' they are part of it."

But the engineering of consent is no new feature of our society even though the media of persuasion have altered. Capitalist ideology has always insisted that promotions to command position are determined by effort, character and merit. Indeed, the insistence on classlessness and the presentation of images of the open society were the characteristic features of classical capitalist ideology. And in many ways the Victorian propagandists were much more successful in fostering the idea of classlessness: it was made relevant and persuasive to many artisans by the genuine range of opportunity which society offered them. Thus Edmund Potter, a leading Glossop industrialist, told his townsmen in 1856: "some are born with fortune, more are born without any, and the struggle for it is very serious. It is the best educated of these, the most talented and industrious who take the prize, but all may possess industry which is, after all, the starting point and by far the most valuable power." Samuel Smiles spread the message that "anyone who devotes himself to making money body and soul can scarcely fail to become rich."

The means of persuasion were in some ways more powerful than today, for they were anchored to a shared social and religious ethic. Nonconformity was both religious doctrine and social morality; it was a common bond between the entrepreneur and many of his workers; a shared religion imposing, as the imperatives of religion, the social norms of the risen industrialist. And nonconformity had its secular counterpart in the doctrine of self-help and thrift, which were given the status of revealed truths. The media of persuasion were the chapel and the characteristic institutions of self-help and thrift: the Savings Bank and the Mechanics Institute. "Next to the Church I would teach the young the road to the Savings Bank," said an early protagonist of the Savings Bank movement. Throughout society the paths to success were charted for the artisan. Benjamin Heywood begged the Manchester mechanics to look to the example of Watt:
"Let me entreat you to read his life—a ye, again and again—and to hold him up as a standard for yourself and your children to follow. He raised himself up by his industry and his talents to opulence and honour and 'many generations will pass away before he shall have gathered all his fame.'"16

And Samuel Smiles showed that thrift and accumulation could be as certain a way to the top as invention:

"Thrift produces capital; and capital is the conserved result of labour. The capitalist is merely the man prepared to forgo present satisfaction for the sake of future reward."17

The message was drummed up in sermons, homilies, moral fables, inspirational works, cautionary tales—even in verse, for in the eighteen sixties the Songs for English Working-men to Sing told them to

"Work, boys, work and be contented
So long as you've enough to buy a meal;
The man, you may rely
Will be wealthy by and by
If he'll put his shoulder to the wheel."18

The Mass Media today are said to inculcate classlessness by the images of society which they present and the cultural and social goals which they prescribe. The working class, writes Stuart Hall, are being "proletarianised upwards towards roughly middle-class standards of life." But the Victorian society was notably more successful in the "bourgeoisification" of the working class. Thomas Wright wrote that working men are continually told "as a sort of stock climax that the working classes in the present time have, as everyday comforts and conveniences, things which even as luxuries were beyond the reach of the Plantagenet kings."19 And even though this was not accepted as entirely true the working class had, at its upper levels, undergone a profound assimilation to the culture of Victorian capitalism. Top-hatted, frock-coated, sporting his Gold Albert, the trade union leader was only the most conspicuous example of this. For the artisans and their unions were caught up in the middle-class cult of respectability. The Pioneer—weekly paper of the Birmingham builders—celebrated the achievement in this way:

"What a scene on a Sunday morning. A meeting of prayer? No. A Sunday school? No. A breakfast coteries perhaps? Nothing like it. Nothing less, gentle reader, than a committee meeting of the operative builders to make arrangement for the building of a Guildhall. It seemed the nucleus of regeneration, an escape from the pothouse to the temple of respectability. Labour is actually becoming respectable."20

CLASS IN POST-WAR BRITAIN

THERE are two trends or movements which are said to be producing classlessness in our society. For Hoggart the society is becoming open through "a significant inter-class movement" generated by educational opportunity and occupational mobility. Stuart Hall is more cautious about the change in class structure, although he sees a significant spread of the middle levels of opportunity in British industry. In his view classlessness comes essentially from the growing equality in consumer patterns and the adoption by the working class of middle-class styles of life. The two arguments are really separate, and I want to start by discussing inter-class movement.

Inter-class movement does not, by itself, weaken a traditional class structure. Quite commonly it strengthens it, making it more flexible and better able to accommodate rising groups. The upward movement of individuals within a predominantly hierarchical social structure butresses the power of the leading social groups, it does not displace them. The historic strength of the English class system has been its ability to accommodate a good deal of inter-class movement: thus Gladstone defended the throwing open of the Civil Service to competitive examination on the grounds that it would "strengthen and multiply the ties between the higher classes and the possessors of administrative power."21

The characteristic feature of our recent social history has been not classlessness but the extraordinary stability of the English class system, and its ability to accommodate the massive political and technological changes in our society. This is shown very clearly in the comprehensive studies on Social Mobility edited by Professor Glass in 1953. His statistics show a fairly constant level of inter-class movement throughout the half-century. New avenues for advancement have been opened up but this was compensated by contraction in others. The proportion of middle-class occupations has hardly changed: it was 24.7 per cent in 1911, 25.4 per cent in 1951.2 Shifts upwards or downwards tend to be of short distance variety because of rigidity at the top.23 Grammar Schools, Public Schools and University recruitment tend rather to reinforce social stratification than to dissolve it,24 and the Public Schools "cut across the line of social mobility, blocking ascent to and limiting descent from the upper reaches of social status."25 Professor Glass concluded that the general picture is of a rather stable social structure, and one in which social status tended to operate within, so to speak, a closed circuit. Social origins have conditioned educational level and both have conditioned achieved social status.26

MEN AT THE TOP

At the top of society, post-war social change has greatly strengthened the position of the upper and upper-middle classes. It has shifted the basis for their wealth from rentier investment and declining Empire to the prosperous and expanding institutions of finance and industry. They have escaped the heavy pressures of inflation by turning increasingly to industry. The corporate financing of their privileges has shielded them from the heavy taxation of personal incomes.27 This is shown in the changing pattern of upper-class careers. In 1951 38 per cent of Public School leavers from 125 schools went into industry; by 1956 the numbers had risen to 51 per cent from 170 schools.28 It is also shown in recent studies of business leadership. G. H. Copeman, studying 1,243 Directors of Public Companies, found that 58 per cent had been to a Public School—5.1 per cent of them to Eton.29 R. V. Clements found a similar domination—though he was studying managers and not directors, in a sample drawn from an area distant from the London centre of social and economic power. Social class determined promotion to positions of management, and it determined the level of success attained: "in a sense, top jobs have been filled by men, usually of higher social origin, expecting, and sometimes even trained for, top management." Graduate managers were "overwhelmingly from the higher social ranges." They were chosen.

"Not so much for intelligence as for having the right sort of personality. In practice the right sort of personality generally means an Oxford or Cambridge and, more often than not, a public school and upper class social background."30

And at the top of finance and industry, upper-class domination is even more pronounced. A recent study has
shown that approximately 30 per cent of the Directors of the main institutions of banking and finance are drawn from the top six Public Schools and are closely linked, to each other, to the Conservative Party leadership and to the landed aristocracy, by an intricate series of marriage alliances. Industry, in fact, has replaced Empire as the "vast system of outdoor relief" for the English upper classes. Purged of their rentiers and their weaker groups, active in the management of a prosperous economy, the English upper classes have taken on a new lease of life.

Post-war society often looks mobile and open to opportunity because we are very aware of the new and expanding channels of advancement—Eleven Plus, the Scholarship Boy, Management Trainee Schemes—but have forgotten those which have contracted or disappeared. We see the rise of the new managers and technocrats—a new middle class. But we have forgotten the disappearance of that older, independent middle class which until 1914 was sufficiently powerful and cohesive to support one of the two main political parties—the farmers, whom Disraeli described as "the most numerous and the most prosperous portions of the middle class," the middle-level entrepreneurs and businessmen who have been declining since 1918, or the older professions (Church, Law, Army) which have declined in status since the war. We have seen the great expansion of white-collar jobs, but we have forgotten the decline in status of the black-coated aristocracy—bank and insurance clerks—and the way in which the clerical wage structure, with its annual increments and seniority rights, has hidden the decline in genuine upward mobility.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Mobility in post-war Britain has become much more conspicuous. In the nineteenth century upward mobility was locally limited—the magnet for social aspiration was the local ruling elite which was to be found, powerful and wealthy, in every industrial and country town. But with the disappearance of the local ruling elites mobility has been channelled more and more towards the larger towns, especially towards London. In 1954 only 18 per cent of Glossop Grammar School leavers found employment in the town: the only post-war Glossop university graduates who have returned to the town have returned as school teachers. More and more, London, as the centre of economic power and the home of the spreading mass-communications industries, has become the magnet for social aspiration. Upward movement from the working class has become much more prominent, not because its proportions have changed, but because it is now organised through the Grammar School and the University, where previously it took place through the local workshop and factory. Thus Clements finds that there has been no increase in the proportion of managers from working-class families since the war—they are still a small minority, bunched at the lower levels of the managerial hierarchy, but

"With the growth of state secondary education, boys who formerly would have become managers after attending only an elementary school, now first attended the secondary schools; they were not in addition to the managers educated at the elementary school, but in place of some of them." Neither the 1944 Act, nor the growth of the provincial universities, nor the increased demand for technicians had yet altered the pattern.

Graduate managers in this sample, whether in the arts or the sciences, of whatever group, are overwhelmingly from the higher social ranges... Recent appointments of graduate engineers at these firms show no movement away from the higher social origins... The implications are that the people who were able to take fullest advantage of the growth of educational opportunity since 1944 were those with the most advantageous social origins, and consequently they have been the chief beneficiaries of greater economic opportunity.

Thus the structural changes in post-war society do not seem to be pointing in the direction of classlessness; rather they are reinforcing the English class system.

WORKERS AND INDUSTRY

STUART HALL believes that workers have been made more responsive to the sense of classlessness by a transformation in the nature of industrial work. Industry has been "humanised" and "personalised" from above to soften the working class and make them "more responsive to managerial patter about 'productivity' and 'the responsibility of the firm.'" There has been "a spread of the ideology of 'human relations' and 'personnel management' in industry—a conception of worker-management relations which has invaded the more advanced points of British industry."

I think he exaggerates the scope of this. "Personnel management" still seems confined, in the main, to management personnel: the "personalisation of work" doesn't seem to have reached the shop floor level yet at such "advanced points" of British industry as Margam, Briggs, B.M.C., London Airport or De Havillands. Hall also seems to suggest that the skilled worker is being replaced in modern industry by the white-collar technologist. But George Friedman's conclusion seems a truer picture: he writes that modern technology has displaced skilled labour in one part of the industrial process, or in one industry, only to swell it in another; in most trades "occupational skill, instead of being destroyed, has only been transferred." Formerly the skill of the artisan was expended on the objects produced; now it is expended on the machines, tools, and materials to produce them.

The main impact of modern industry has not been to divide or to "soften" the working class but to make them much more homogenous and much more conscious of class. In the nineteenth century the working class was divided or to "soften" the working class but to make them equivalent to an hereditary distinction of caste." Thomas Wright wrote in 1873:

"Between the artisan and the unskilled labourer a gulf is fixed... There is an educated and really intelligent section, and an uneducated, ignorant section; a sober, saving, steady section and a drunken, unstable thriftless section... The artisan creed with regard to the labourers is that the latter are an inferior class and they should be made to know and kept in their places."

Modern industry has ended this gulf. It has upgraded the skills and wages of a very large group of workers: the unskilled, the casuals and the rural labourers are no longer, as they were in the nineteenth century, the main component of the country's labour force. It has multiplied the jobs of the semi-skilled—a category that was unknown in British industry before the late nineteenth century. And all this has meant, especially since 1914, a considerable narrowing in the differentials and the divisions between the skilled worker and the bulk of industrial labour.

The increased cohesion of the industrial working class can be clearly seen in politics. It is only in the past fifteen years that a Party claiming to speak for 'Labour'...
has been able to muster a steady 50 per cent of the country's votes. And it can be seen in trade union life. In the nineteenth century the skilled unions were the stronghold of working-class conservatism and the working-class acceptance of the capitalist ethic. Their principal concern was the exclusion from their trades—their "vested" interest as the Engineers' Society termed it—of the unskilled. Thus the motto of the Birmingham brushmakers:

"In love and unity we support our trade and keep out those who would our right invade."

How different are the unions of the skilled today! In the years since 1945 they have been much the most politically aware and class-conscious part of the trade union movement: both the "old" skilled unions—the engineers, boilermakers, sheetmetal workers—and the new—the technicians, supervisors, draughtsmen.

**Working Class Community**

STUART HALL'S description of classlessness takes over Riesman's model of "other-directed man" although this model, like Whyte's *Organisation Man*, derives explicitly from a study of the behaviour of the young urban upper middle class of America. With "consumer capitalism", taste leadership, status striving and consumption goals are displacing the traditional sense of class:

"Consumption has been so built into capitalism that it has become the most significant relationship between the working class and the employing class. . . . Commodities have become insignias of class and status. Through the purchase and display of certain kinds of consumer goods a working class can define its social standing in relation to other families: they can even—so the advertisers suggest—raise their class position by buying the right kinds of goods . . . the whole way of life is breaking down into several styles of living (this is the language of the furniture advertisements) each imperceptibly but, as Whyte says, 'exquisitely' differentiated, one from another. 'Homemaking' and gardening are not community skills but subtle modes of status differentiation, a kind of individualism which enters the home, so to speak 'with the new furniture,' *Women's Realm* and the *Practical Householder*. . . . Many must feel a personal repugnance against involving themselves in a series of interlocking rat races. But what else can they do? . . . One cannot organise militantly to keep up with the Joneses."

For the past two months I have been working as an interviewer on a survey of some working-class families and my general picture is almost exactly the contrary to Stuart Hall's. Here at least the status striving and the status anxious were a small minority. There was not much differentiation—"exquisite" or otherwise—in consumer purchases.

This sort of reaction is not very surprising. There are, after all, severe and felt physical limits to working-class consumption: can you really buy yourself a middle-class style of life—or even believe that you are buying yourself a middle-class style of life—if you are a family man on a housing estate with a weekly wage of £10 or £11 a week which may, with overtime, rise to £13 or £14, but which will always remain on the basis of the weekly wage contract? It is one thing to be saving up to buy a washing machine or to replace the TV which really is rather too small and too run down to receive a clear picture—quite another to worry, like the Park Forest executive, about the proper shape of the second car or, with the stockbroker on the District Line, about where one moves to after fifteen years in Wimbledon. And are these really status symbols? The new furniture seems easily assimilated to the clutter and warmth of the living room. Obviously there are the status anxious and the status striving, and their opportunities expand in a period of prosperity. But they are a minority. They are not necessarily the same as the people who like to "keep themselves to themselves" because they are shy or because they're simply unfriendly people. We underestimate the strength and importance of working-class values if we think they can disappear before the impact of the washing machine and the *Practical Householder*.

Underpinning the argument is a gross exaggeration of the power of the Mass Media. The advertisers may "suggest" that people can raise their class position by buying the right kind of goods, but that is absolutely no warrant for saying that this is what in fact happens, let alone for asserting that the working class are inevitably involved in "a series of interlocking rat races." It seems quite probable that some thousands more people on the trains from the suburbs are reading *The Times* because it gives them a sort of vicarious participation in life at the top or even identifies them with it; but it is surely absurd to think of millions of working-class housewives choosing their washing powders by reference to the several styles of gracious living which the Ad.-men present to them. Are the "dreamland" images of show-business glitter and middle-class manners really so compulsive? Who is going to accept *that* world as being their own actual or potential? Doesn't its total irrelevance to working-class life neutralise the impact? The means of persuasion are said to have become all powerful—so powerful that they are seen transforming social class—because they are so centralised: but this very concentration of the Mass Media also makes them remote from working-class life. I am not at all trying to diminish the value and truth of the recent discussion on Mass Media but only pointing to an alternative conclusion: why should we assume that images so "banal," trivialised and "candy floss" have overwhelmed a strong working-class culture or are likely to do so?

If socialism has weakened in this country it is not because of the "new opportunities" or the post-war prosperity or a pervasive power of the Mass Media—though all these are immensely important in any picture of our society. It is principally because socialists have not

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offered a meaningful picture of the society in which we live or an alternative vision of the socialist society which people can make. In reconstructing socialist ideas we will have to look again at the structure of class in this country, and we will have to reject the idea of the "manipulated mass."

Socialism must start from the existing strengths of working people, from their power to assimilate. What is valuable and reject what is false in post-war society. In a period of unexampled prosperity the Labour Movement and working people generally have remained immune to the grosser forms of capitalist persuasion. Socialism is not only, as is sometimes said, a society for people—it is also a society that they will create.

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